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In contemporary Polish, there often appears the trivial mistake: “in another 
optics,” or, even worse, “to change the optics of seeing.” That fallacy sounds like 
breaking a lens or crushing glasses, yet I wish to make that mistake, I wish to 
prove another way of seeing. I wrote “seeing”, but, in fact, what I meant was “non-
seeing”, “shutting my eyelids”, and “pretend and real blindness.” I have already 
fallen into contradictions, from which no paradox can retrieve me, though I have 
prepared several paradoxes in my defence. For a second, the glare of a paradox 
beautifully lights up the darkness. What I mean, though, is darkness viewed in 
permanent light. Had I started with the following invitation: “I wish to explain 
the problem of secretiveness in contemporary culture,” I would had acted against 
my internal defiance towards the mechanisms of writing, I would had broken the 
principle which I wish to present in ill light – the principle of general explaining. 
Therefore, I shall write about light, explaining, and transparency transitioning 
freely from metaphor to notions, from a person to a shadow, and from openness to 
secretiveness. I am actually not driven by an objection to openness, rather by my 
laughter caused by openness which demands the right to become the whole world. 
That laughter arrives from a clearly realised darkness. A shadow and secretive-
ness are two metaphors which I feel as the manifestations of darkness in the life of 
an individual. The “manifestations of darkness” formula sounds like a quotation 
from Novalis, or from the gnostic miłosz, and refers to the currently disdained 
metaphysics. Surely I will not avoid that label, though I am referring to darkness 
and lightness tailored by obvious views. I apply the metaphor of darkness to the 
area unidentified by man: things unidentified in the past, unforeseen in the future, 
unilluminated in the individual, unread in the cosmos and the cosmic existence 
of humanity, and unknown within the matter of the cosmos itself – one could list 
many more dark and black things. However, for me the darkest of all seems not 
the darkness of the unknown but the time which precedes existence, and occurs 
afterwards. The flash of existence lights up the darkness of endless time – that is 
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one of the maxims that come to my mind. Yet no maxims are needed. It will suf-
fice to compare our persistence and that of a cobblestone, or to slowly descend the 
tree of evolution to the form of primeval life, or to take up the theories of the be-
ginning of the universe, and experience a work of art. Yes, that will suffice to find 
measure between darkness and lightness, that will suffice to laugh at the common 
openness and transparency. But why are openness and transparency so murky?
In the era of revealing and transparency, it is difficult to keep a secret. mys-
tery became exceptionally valuable and exceptionally cheap. What I mean is the 
selling price. People value those secrets which can be sold, and devalue others for 
which the demand is low. It is difficult not to succumb to profit, and sell hidden 
content. When we consider the significance of a secret traditionally, and when we 
understand the price literally, we avoid a sale of secrets. Today, it is often the case 
that secrets once valued extremely high, are incredibly difficult to sell. Not only to 
sell, but also to share or even reveal. I am referring to artistic and spiritual forms, 
which also, once revealed, remain impenetrable for some, not secrets of exact 
sciences, which were valued only once, i.e. at the time of sale. I focus only on the 
hidden meanings of modernist culture, which, possibly, are also the terminal val-
ues of modernism. Let us say that I treat secretiveness as the sign of the end of that 
trend. I similarly interpret the fact of discounting secrets. In such an intellectual 
project, it would be difficult not to use notions which present the play between 
a secret and revealing, as the dialectics of secret knowledge and the knowledge of 
a blasphemer, esoterica and exoterica, initiation and surface, eliteness and egali-
tarianism. The lexicon of modernism suggests many terms, which translate into 
or quote religious terms. Out of that extensive collection, I choose non-obvious 
terms, though generally understood and used in their metaphorical meanings: se-
cretiveness and shadow. I associate those terms with the understanding of internal 
freedom. I do not introduce the third value, so obvious in the era of revealing, 
i.e. “silence”, though I shall also discuss silence, which is afraid to or does not 
want to speak. I am rather interested in the “eloquent silence”1, or even talkative 
silence or talking about silence. That paradoxical revealing is interesting not only 
then when it reveals a secret, but also when it wishes to maintain it, concealed. 
On which side does the literary scientist who studies secrets stand? On the side of 
general transparency or on the side of keeping a secret hidden? I believe that the 
modern researcher gradually transitions to the side of devaluing it. Initially, they 
introduce readers into the secrets of a work, later once more reveal secrets which 
had previously been discussed by the writers themselves, and finally begin sell-
ing literary meanings as one sells slogans, articles and gossip. I am interested in 
 1 T. Merton, Zapiski współwinnego widza, trans. Z. Ławrynowicz and m. maciołek, Dom 
Wydawniczy Rebis, Poznan 1994, p. 311. [English version: merton, T. Conjectures of a Guilty 
Bystander, New York 1966].
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the reflection from before today’s world of common devaluing, or, more precisely, 
in artistic freedom, not yet screened, not yet sold, but already sensing a common 
pressure to reveal and sell. I would like to focus on the philosophy of secretive-
ness, and the methodology of secretiveness, if you will. In the essays of mature 
modernism, I seek deliberations on the topic of secretive being. What I actually 
mean is the secret yet without metaphysics; secret, creative and possible inde-
pendent existence, and such thought. I should also add to that a clear thought on 
secretiveness. Yes, I seek clear secretiveness in the times of murky transparency.
Humour and irony, so common in modernist literature, deprive a secret of 
its eschatological meaning focussing on a secret that shall not be revealed by the 
Supreme Being on the Final Day. Therefore, the shadow comes from the refusal 
of light, and from a lack of hope for the final healing of the world and man. It is 
not the cool shade offering respite, but a shadow dragged behind oneself. Saint 
Thomas Aquinas called that cognitive darkening angustia, i.e. pain and frustra-
tion due to an inability to transcend certain limitations.2 In short, there is a funda-
mental difference between the shadow of faith, and the shadow of modern doubt, 
between a secret in relation to the sensed mystery, and a secret in relation to cos-
mic solitude. There is also a difference between silence strengthened by faith, and 
silence triggered by a fear of triviality. However, one needs only to utter the words 
“triviality” or “profanation”, to find a link between the secret of faith, and secre-
tiveness in modernist literature. I can hear that kinship, though unclear, when 
I read Thomas merton’s remarks on the power of Saint Thomas Aquinas: “There 
is in St. Thomas more than the dry light of the classroom and the businesslike 
proving of theses. His understanding, which is clear as day, owes much also to the 
“night spirit” which communes with what he did not know (…) He is not all talk, 
not a scholastic machine for grinding out answers. Though he was a prodigious 
teacher and writer, the force of his words comes from his silence and his respect 
in the presence of what could never be said.” He protected himself against turning 
into a writing machine for explaining the secrets of the faith, into a scholastic ma-
chine. He was also protected by the spirit of the night, dark by definition, known 
from the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius. But what should we call the modern ma-
chine for explaining? And what secrets does a modernist writer want to hide from 
common transparency?
W.G. Sebald in his deliberations on a play entitled Kaspar by Peter Handke, 
quickly fell into sarcasm regarding the modern pressure for naming things. He re-
ferred to that necessity as the “colonial empire of the spirit.”3 It resembles musil’s 
ironic comparison of knowledge to parsimony and scrimping, i.e. to “internal 
 2 Ibid., p. 294.
 3 W.G. Sebald, Campo Santo, trans. m. Łukasiewicz, Wydawnictwo WAB, Warsaw 2014, 
p. 69. [English version: Sebald W.G. Campo Santo. New York 2005].
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capitalism.” Kaspar was colonised, enlightened and terrorised, i.e. taught. The 
educational machine worked on transforming him into a citizen. Apparently Se-
bald easily turned the meaning of educational work. Kaspar found himself in 
“new and excessively bright surroundings.” He treated explaining and naming as 
part of himself, as an internalised obtrusive voice, as if it was his “own individual 
madness.”4 From that conclusion there is but one step to comparing the grammar 
of an utterance to torture devices, and naming to dissection. Sebald also recalled 
the well-known concretisation of the dissection machine from In the Penal Colo-
ny by Franz Kafka. And then he stops us in the reading using an aphorism, which 
he recorded in an electronic modern style: “But what is taken from the living sub-
stance of the individual in the long process of his training to become an articulate, 
moral human being adheres to the linguistic machine until in the end the parts 
become interchangeable in function.”5 Isn’t that a beautiful and terrifying trans-
formation? A metamorphosis which should be dreaded according to writers from 
Čapek and Kafka, through Witkacy and Schulz, to Różewicz and Ionesco. Sebald 
did not emanate fear, but rather a contention of mechanisation, of a common dis-
section. In his essay, the writer imperceptibly identified with Kaspar, and began 
to consider himself as a victim of lightness. Only the times changed, and Kafka’s 
machine was perfected. Sebald referenced a statement by Lars Gustafson, who 
believed that in relation to machines we can comprehend our simulated lives, our 
lives as linguistic machines. I wrote “our” to avoid the well-known mistake, when 
a person writing about common decadence herself/himself avoids degeneration. 
It is, of course, not only about the meeting between a writer and the linguistic ma-
chine, but also the linguistic machine within the writer. When Sebald depicted the 
modern individual, he also depicted himself, at least the unwanted and alien self: 
“A human being, then, is a Stymphalian creature of metal screws and springs, 
blanking widespread patterns made of communication sheet metal, and language, 
apparatus which has gone out of control, and begins to lead a menacing life of 
its own.”6 In that beautiful description of a mechanised being, what is surprising 
is the reference to the Hercules myth. Is it possible that people wound up with 
prattle resembled the Stymphalian birds, which often killed humans and animals 
with whole clouds of bronze arrows? In the myth, the swamp birds had beaks and 
wings made of that alloy. Travellers had to protect their bodies under sophisti-
cated armour, since such metal beaks could pierce many metal breastplates. Her-
cules used some magic rattle to scare away flocks of them and shoot them down. 
maybe that is a way to deal with prattle, and mechanical speakers? To use a barrel 
organ, a voice recorder, or a prayer wheel? In the myth, some Stymphalian beings 
 4 Ibid.
 5 Ibid., p. 71.
 6 Ibid.
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escaped alive to multiply elsewhere, and to poison with their faeces other fields 
away from the swamps. In Sebald’s essay, there is no encouragement for heroic 
deeds. Kaspar submits to lightness, and begins to imagine himself according to 
the mechanisms of communication, or rather not Kaspar but, as Sebald wrote, 
Kaspars as the mechanised language produced identities similar to each other. 
The name Kaspar is given to several “copies”. Not everything is entirely proper 
with those copies or blanks, maybe because education began so late? maybe that 
is why Kaspar nostalgically reminisced about times before he spoke a dead lan-
guage? When his rebellion had not been broken yet? Actually only regression, to 
use Schulz’s term, offers hope for freedom. Kaspar draws from an unclear, unil-
luminated by the word, uneducated zone, hope for himself, and from that zone 
Sebald derived free creativity. An experience not yet named using any available 
and imposing words also reveals the meaning of common openness. Repeated 
common words are mere “dead abridgement of the whole,” as Cassirer stated in 
the conclusion of the essay. In his final sentence, Sebald inscribed a hope of the 
time of modernism – on the possibility of saving art: “Literature can transcend 
this dilemma (of a language as a dead abridgement of existence – TB) only by 
keeping faith with unsocial, banned language, and by learning to use the opaque 
images of broken rebellion as a means of communication.”
In a book entitled Vie secrète, Pascal Quignard described the mystery of love 
and desire, and found for his topic analogies which amplified the significance 
of leaving people and leaving one’s time. many modernist artists sought forms of 
protecting and creating themselves away from the public pedagogy, forms which 
would be different from the common formation of individuals. Those private ex-
ercises of the spirit were not as threatened as they are today because never before 
had so many languages illuminated an individual. In an aphorism formed in Ni-
etzsche’s style, Quignard offered the following syllogism: “To have a soul means 
to have a secret. Conclusion. Few people have souls.”7 Nonetheless, it is an enthy-
meme, while omitting the premise which I would state as follows: most people 
allow others to browse them, or, slightly differently, in Quignard’s manner: few 
people protect their secrets. That syllogism resonates with sarcasm, visible also 
in other statements of the writer: “The most contemptible is the man who cannot 
leave the place of his birth, and cut the strings in which he was entangled in the first 
years of his life by the fear of obedience: to the family, group, and silent impulses.”
Fascination gives way to desideration.
“An aristocrat freezing in front of a portrait of his ancestor. A master chef 
avoiding hot spices – they are pathetic.”8 Where did that sarcasm come from? 
 7 P. Quinard, Życie sekretne, trans. K. Rutkowski, Vesper, Poznan 2006, p. 76. [English version 
translated from Polish].
 8 Ibid., p. 172.
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From the need to break the bonds which are extremely durable? Paedagogia is 
doing better in the West every day, even Eros has been taught well? In fact, Quig-
nard referred indirectly to Bataille and his concept of eroticism as a zone of crea-
tive existence. For Quignard, Eros, asocial at its beginnings, thus becomes in 
maturity, restoring the individual obscurity, loss, temporariness, and a compli-
cated relationship with matter and mother. The images and premonitions of the 
French writer, so close to those of Schulz, refer to speaking which ought to be 
extracted from bodily matter. That voice incessantly deafened by the prattle of the 
world, and vocalised by the languages of others, wishes to enter the zones which 
have not yet been displayed or uttered. Behold the spaces of internal freedom, 
spaces of recognising oneself. No wonder then that Quignard sought the voice 
and the touch of his mother before she began to speak the pedagogic voice. That 
journey outside time and society resulted in literature which refers to shadows, 
not a discourse which is turned by cognition into a bromide, i.e. makes it part of 
a common useful surveillance. It is widely known that the author of Vie secrète 
referred to music, a zone in which the culture of the West has always defended 
itself against obtrusive words: “Good musicians extract sounds from the most 
ancient quarters of our bodies (from resonators: the abdomen, the uteral cave, the 
place of previous residence).”9 It seems that Quignard saw a relationship between 
the modern explanation and the Christian concept of morality, as if the modern 
mind illuminating existence constituted a continuation of the zone of the state and 
science – the Christian concept of sin and salvation. In the history of thought, he 
found Tertulian with his phrase “you need to hide even in paradise” to conclude 
“I do not understand why Tertulian’s thesis has not found any continuators.”10 
A dark issue that there exists a relationship between the concept of divine omni-
presence, an enlightenment mind screening everything, and a modern impersonal 
alliance between the state and global marketing. That is why Quignard referred to 
Tertulian’s abandoned formula to justify his unclear conscience as an individual 
secretly recognising the creative significance of Eros. His apophthegmatas refer 
to a secret which carries the burden of the original sin. “In Eden, the first woman 
could not have existed without a secret,” he wrote supporting the concealed not 
the omnipresent conscience. The screening view dispossesses the subject of his 
existential being, and offers him defenceless to social play. Fortunately, Quignard 
did not focus on the monsters of transparency, indifferently archaic or post-mod-
ern, but on protecting a secret because the protection of the creative particular 
one always happens within a particular existence, not within a public debate when 
many voices and discourses are vocalised. Whatever the situation might be, social 
voices will still find a path towards our discussion of ourselves. Thus Quignard 
 9 Ibid., p. 68.
 10 Ibid., p. 79.
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subjected the principle to a spiritual or rather erotic independence: “The secret: 
escape that which is verbal, what is social. Not to escape that which is sexual, 
which is mortal.”11
Or maybe that is not a question of freedom but temperament? – I am start-
ing to doubt Quignard’s authoritative words. Is it the temperament, the erotic fire 
that orders the writer to hide from the community? maybe that was the reason 
why he spoke in a dark laconic form, and had no patience for a systematic argu-
ment? Those doubts were suggested to me by merton, who considered Tertulian’s 
words from the treatise on patience. merton valued that treatise since Tertulian 
was extremely impatient. Therefore, the treatise bears the signs of an overcome 
force, actually a force not completely overcome in writing. Tertulian’s aphorisms 
are the marks of vehemence turned into stone. Yet the stone is alive. Impatience 
hidden in a style full of life. Quignard does not believe in the value of meta-
physical discipline, or in the value of sharing with others. He is a loner and an 
individualist, while he could be just a loner. That has been the feature of many 
modernists – mistrust for the world. Could that mistrust of an individualist stem 
from distrust in the value of the secrets being revealed? A secret also becomes 
an individual matter?! Behold a surprising hypothesis: for modernism, a secret is 
a form of a public confession. A modernist writer at the same time encrypts and 
decrypts a confiteor as long as they believe in “absolution” through literature. 
A widespread revealing bestows upon an individual separate existence a mass 
dimension, and trivialises the value of a literary confession. To protect a secret 
means to confer with one’s own fate, to talk mechanically means to agree to 
blurring individual features. Thus is the secret, historically limited, individual, 
virtually intransmittable. The result of the literary discipline of a loner afraid of 
transparency and devaluation.
The modern story of secret freedom begins with the start of modernity, and 
defines one of the most important trends in modernism. That beginning was per-
fectly expressed by the titles of the two parts of Baudelaire’s diaries: Dzienniki 
poufne (Secret Diaries) and Moje serce obnażone (My Heart Laid Bare). And 
the two trials of Flaubert and Baudelaire for offending public morality, and the 
pornographic pleasure of a man who denounced both artists – those hidden mas-
turbations of a good Christian. The accuser condemned mysteries – concealed 
by him and revealed by the writers, because he wanted to express his submission 
to socially accepted moral norms and state order. Their, the informer’s and the 
writers’, secrets differed considerably as the accuser could not imagine the fact 
that pornography expressed the same affinity to screening everything as the one 
displayed by a modern state. Literature protects eroticism against the kitsch of 
pornography, and other usurpations of rationality and politicisation. The word 
 11 Ibid., p. 80.
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“protects” hides various meanings. I shall reveal two: an artist protects them-
selves from the common persuasions, protects their secrets to find visions, which 
for a moment will become the property of the readers experiencing independence 
during the reading. In French thought, that co-existence of a secret and a vision 
was presented by Jean-Noël Vuarnet in: Le Philosophe-artiste. In his analysis, 
Vuarnet referred to “three central figures of modernity”, as defined by Nietzsche, 
i.e.: the prophet, the scholar, and the leader.12 As is widely known, those figures, 
which in contemporary times “show a uniform underneath their shirts”, Nietzsche 
juxtaposed with an artist, i.e. someone who while being occupied with creating 
new values, does not care about “herd celebrations.” Of course he juxtaposed 
himself, with all his affinities for a uniform, science, and prophecies. Vuarnet de-
scribed a philosopher who performed exorcisms on himself to extract from with-
in the unwanted forms of modern civilisation. Vaurnet verified the value of the 
transformation of a philosopher who becomes an artist/philosopher in the times 
contemporary for us, in the age of technocratic prophecies, and, if you will, in the 
age of technocratic transparency. He was anxious about the similarity between 
Nietzsche’s artist/philosopher and a “creator/economist/engineer, like Speer or 
Keynes.”13 Who are those creators? “Those creators made man and ideology as 
the objects of their treatments and experiments. They do not need paper or ink 
– the instruments they prefer include information, propaganda, functional arche-
types, and stereotypes. Synthesisers and manipulators of ideology, promoters and 
producers of circumstantial truths, those prophets do not even need to utter their 
prophecies, they fulfil them. Technocracy does not want ideologists but teachers 
who could cope without a doctrine, and pose as “objective” sources of all evalu-
ations, treated no longer as evaluations, but only as the consequences of rational 
management.”14 Nietzsche’s paradox consisted of a prophecy which comes true 
against it, i.e. based on a false prophet, whose rule should not be fulfilled. Vaurnet 
exposed the paradox of Nietzsche’s creation, and of the creations of other crea-
tors, one expressed as: “everyone for themselves,” which supposes the depriving 
of the reasons of those who proceed those (creators). In that lesson, one must 
add the hidden premise, which transforms the creative reading in repeating and 
stereotypisation. The abandonment of a hidden work on oneself evoked by a read-
ing occurs in the name of common abandonment of work on one’s own iden-
tity, on the protection of one’s own otherness, on developing one’s own shadow. 
A modern reader wishes to browse a book, and transform into a set of bromides 
prescribed by some commonly known discourse. They similarly cope with their 
shadow. They screen it with the zeal of a technocrat, a psychologist, a judge, 
 12 J.-N. Vuarnet, Filozof-artysta, trans. K. matuszewski, słowo/obraz terytoria, Gdansk 2000, 
p. 151. [English version translated from Polish].
 13 Ibid., p. 155.
 14 Ibid., pp. 155, 156.
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a moralist, a priest, a teacher, etc. They replace Nietzsche’s instruction “be, if you 
can, the source of your evaluations”15 with a more convenient formula “let others 
evaluate themselves, so we can evaluate them.” One basic question deserves an 
answer: what place within the modern technocratic system does an artist/phi-
losopher who avoids ruling occupy? Vuarnet bitterly answered that the system 
needs such an artist, it needs “thinkers and theoreticians of their own desires” “to 
make the system if not fully assimilable, then at least possible: rose-coloured.”16 
The French philosopher’s answer belongs to the well-known tradition of under-
standing modernity, which is close to me as well. Understanding modernism as 
a trend, which transforms the severely inhabitable reality created by the mind 
into a place available for living. Vuarnet is bothered by the utilitarian nature of 
art activity, which nonetheless supports technocratic goals. That is why he con-
cluded his deliberations with an image of liberation: “It remains a dream of one 
or several utopias, which would place themselves outside the silent cynicism of 
administrators, and outside the discourse of doubling theoreticians.”17 Vuarnet 
experiences strongly the penetration of the hidden separate zone of visions and 
thought by public conventionalised discourses. He is so much concerned with the 
use of thought in the inhuman impersonal process, that he finds little joy in culti-
vating the shadow, secretiveness, and in practising self-recognition. He is anxious 
when internal freedom becomes part of a publicly practised positive freedom, 
which could have such a name only in typologies since he understands public 
freedom as freedom to fulfil goals which deny the rights of an individual who 
fulfils them. It is actually the seeming fulfilment of goals, or rather fulfilments, 
by common goals argued and offered by marketing or political persuasions, that 
transforms political freedom into public captivity, which calls itself fulfilment or 
success. Therefore, the artist/philosopher is afraid of being used as a means of 
soothing mental captivity, while his art shall be transformed into a bromide. What 
bromide? For example, one that screams: “private narrative”, “controversial mes-
sage”, “scandalising image”, etc. Vuarnet fears a common right to transparency, 
according to which a deep shadow must become a shadow which is transparent, 
comprehensible, and useful.
When we illuminate the hidden, we lose a basic part of internal freedom, 
which stems from the secret. I do not wish to state that freedom and the secret are, 
essentially, the same, and that anyone who does not explain a secret salvages their 
freedom. I am only arguing that the creative work on oneself occurs away from 
the expressed, rhetoricised, discoursified, and anticipated. How much a culture 
loses when it is screened by an enlightened mind one can feel when one considers 
 15 Ibid., p. 157.
 16 Ibid., p. 176.
 17 Ibid., p. 177.
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the West from the perspective of the culture of the shadow – from the perspec-
tive of traditional Japanese culture. In In Praise of Shadows, Tanizaki Junichiro 
mentioned many pleasures which one loses in the bright light, from the emotion 
upon seeing rice in a lacquerware bowl, through raindrops one listens to in the 
toilet, to ghosts which are not transparent. The Japanese writer was terrified by 
the European seeking of filth, in full light, and the obsession to mark out borders 
between pure and impure, an obsession which has also been shared by the Japa-
nese. Europeans expelled from their secrets to the streets and the agora remove 
in public places and discussions any instances of those from their bodies, homes, 
and minds. As a result they submit to the present and contemporary times, or 
actually the obsession of the future, which at some point shall screen everything. 
Junichiro also defined a shadowy perfect place for Europeans: The light from the 
pale white paper, powerless to dispel the heavy darkness of the alcove, is instead 
repelled by the darkness, creating a world of confusion where dark and light are 
indistinguishable. Have not you yourselves sensed a difference in the light that 
suffuses such a room, a rare tranquillity not found in ordinary light? Have you 
never felt a sort of fear in the face of the ageless, a fear that in that room you might 
lose all consciousness of the passage of time, that untold years might pass and 
upon emerging you should find you had grown old and grey?18 The fear of eternity 
captivates the people of the West so much that they construct their surroundings 
to be transparent, and devoid of any shadows. They eat that way, they hygienise 
sex that way, they clean death that way in order to deprive themselves of the right 
to a mystery. michel maffesoli, a French sociologist and anthropologist, saw in 
those inclinations manifestations of an Apolline spirit, which wanted to bring to 
Europe boredom, abstraction, and manipulation. maffesoli argued that the in-
tellectual whole is currently decaying, and we are entering an era of “a brittle 
community, fragmented society, tribal community turning the sediment of vari-
ous particular interests new modes of thinking of the attitude to the natural and 
social world.”19 That optimist argues that “we stand on the fringe of the shadow, 
we return to an existential chiaroscuro.”20 We stopped seeking God, we are stop-
ping seeking secular divinity in the State, the Institution or the Politics, and we 
are starting to seek divinity within, in the tribal turbulence, or in the rhythm of 
the world.21 That is the attitude maffesoli wishes to seek also in contemporary 
 18 T. Junichiro, Pochwała cienia, trans. H. Lipszyc, in: Estetyka japońska. Antologia, vol. 3: 
Estetyka życia i piękno umierania, Krystyna Wilkoszewska (ed.), Universitas, Krakow 2005, p. 92. 
[English version: Junichiro, T., In Praise of Shadows. Leete’s Island Books, Inc. Stony Creek 1977].
 19 M. Maffesoli, Rytm życia. Wariacje na temat świata wyobraźni ponowoczesnej, trans. 
A. Karpowicz, Zakład Wydawniczy „Nomos”, Krakow 2012, p. 103. [English version translated 
from Polish].
 20 Ibid., p. 102.
 21 Ibid., p. 108.
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science, which sometimes is still cognition striving for total explanation. He thus 
wrote about science entangled in modern myths: “There exists science without 
love, for which one does not pay either with one’s existence or even pain.” Two 
lines further on he added a few more epithets: “cool, official scientific knowledge, 
pretentious and vain.”22
The hidden internal freedom, which creates art or science, sucks many terms 
into the shadow: primitiveness, Dionysiousness, eroticism, precognition, intui-
tion, pre-existence, silence… Thus I listed the names of modern spiritual exer-
cises, modernist practices for deepening the shadow. Sebald escaped from the 
modern verbal machine into the zone of regression. Vuarnet does not deceive 
himself in thinking that artistic practices can oppose technocracy. He sees shelter 
somewhere in the far archipelagos of thought. Quignard focussed on his secret 
script similar to that of the others hidden in their niches. maffesoli believes that in 
public life there exist many new practices which bring us closer to creative exist-
ence, on the fringes of the shadow, while Tanizaki felt that European poetics of 
lightness can deprive him of everything that he considered close and his own. As 
the bard said in a poem entitled Wędrówka z cieniem:
Thus we console each other
Walking down long streets…
I’m dragging a shadow, the shadow’s dragging me,
Puddles glisten underneath our feet.23
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Freedom and secretiveness, in late modernism
(Summary)
The text considers two metaphors describing creative freedom in modern society: secretive-
ness and shadow. In the shadow, creative individuals protect themselves against the ubiquitous 
need to explain and screen life. The text proves that contemporary literature (Sebald, Quinard) and 
essay (Vuarnet, maffesoli) search inspiration in secretiveness and shadow while at the same time 
they see a threat to art in the mechanism of explanation.
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